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Abstract—This paper proposes and analyzes a new virtual
machine (VM) placement technique called Group Instance to
deal with co-location attacks in public Infrastructure-as-a-Service
(IaaS) clouds. Specifically, Group Instance organizes cloud users
into groups with pre-determined sizes set by the cloud provider.
Our empirical results obtained via experiments with real-world
data sets containing million of VM requests have demonstrated
the effectiveness of the new technique. In particular, the advan-
tages of Group Instance are three-fold: 1) it is simple and highly
configurable to suit the financial and security needs of cloud
providers, 2) it produces better or at least similar performance
compared to more complicated, state-of-the-art algorithms in
terms of resource utilization and co-location security, and 3) it
does not require any modifications to the underlying infrastruc-
tures of existing public cloud services.
Index Terms—cloud security, co-location attacks, virtual ma-
chine placement.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Infrastructure-as-a-Service clouds [1], large amounts of
computing power are accessible to ordinary users as a service,
in which anyone can request for computing resource on-
demand without significant upfront expenditure. This service
is typically served in the form of Virtual Machines (VM) that
are created upon requests. Each VM is initialized and placed
into one of many Physical Machines (PM) owned by the IaaS
cloud provider. The physical resource of each PM is divided
into isolated partitions by a VM monitor (hypervisor). Then,
each of the partitions will be used to host a VM accordingly.
The assignment of these VMs to PMs is controlled by the
cloud provider through appropriate VM placement algorithms
[2].
Although there are strong isolation mechanisms to ensure
that no data would be shared between different VMs; if the
VMs are in the same PM, they still have to share several types
of common resource in the PM such as the Last-Level Cache,
etc. Such resource sharing enables certain side channels which
could leak data across VMs located on the same PM. This
in turn motivates various kinds of co-location based attacks,
which first involve getting a rogue VM into a particular PM
hosting multiple other ordinary VMs. From there, the rogue
VM might be able to extract confidential information and data
from the victim VMs via existing or new side channels [3].
One notable example was demonstrated by Ristenpart et
al. [4] in an empirical study of such attacks in Amazon EC2
cloud service. The researchers were able to recreate a map of
the underlying physical cloud resources using network probes
and to determine the co-location status of any VMs. Such
information was then used to launch rogue VMs that could
co-locate themselves with a target VM, of which data could
be subsequently extracted via some side-channels. Co-location
attacks have gained more attention as recent vulnerabilities
such as Spectre [5] and Meltdown [6] critically impact major
public cloud providers.
To deal with the threat of co-location attacks, a straight-
forward approach is to separate each user physically. This
method has been practically used by current cloud service
providers, e.g., Amazon EC2’s Dedicated Instance (DI) [7],
[8]. The obvious downside for this approach is low physical
resource utilization, as VMs belong to different users could
not be consolidated on the same PM. As a result, Dedicated
Instance could be significantly more expensive compared to
other types of VMs.
Popular approaches in this area focus on improving both
resource utilization and co-location resistance of the VM
placement algorithms at the same time. Better resource utiliza-
tion could bring significant financial benefits for both cloud
users and providers. Notable approaches include Previously
Selected Server First (PSSF) by Hans et. al. [9] and Previously
Co-located User First (PCUF) [10], [11]. More specifically,
PSSF limits the number of different PMs that a VM from a
particular user can be placed on. On the other hand, PCUF,
which is one of the most recent approaches, aims to reduce
the chance for malicious co-location by only letting VMs of
previously co-located users to share the same PM.
In this paper, we propose a new approach called Group
Instance (GI), in which we also aim to reduce the chance of
malicious co-locations. In essence, GI introduces a new config-
urable parameter, group limit, to maintain a balance between
security and resource utilization. With this new parameter,
GI could be tuned to achieve comparable or even better
performance in terms of resource utilization or co-location
resistance compared to Dedicated Instance, PSSF, or PCUF in
most practical cases. Compared to state-of-the-art approaches
like PCUF, GI has several enhancements: 1) the cloud provider
can easily control of the balance between co-location security
and resource utilization (which directly affects the resource
cost), 2) it is simpler to analyze and implement, and 3) it
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provides better or similar performance compared to existing
approaches most of the time, as demonstrated in the empirical
experiments using real workload traces from Azure [12].
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we discuss the most recent related work. In Section
III, we elaborate the problem statement. We then describe our
VM placement algorithm and its theoretical analysis in Section
IV. Section V describes our empirical study of the algorithm.
Finally, Section VI discusses the limitations of our research
and some directions for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
We broadly classify existing work in defending against co-
location based attacks into two categories, namely direct and
indirect approaches.
A. Direct approaches
These approaches hinder malicious users directly by apply-
ing changes or patches into the existing cloud infrastructure
to remove any known side channels in the platform. Such
changes may make it much harder for any attackers when
they try to achieve co-locations with other users. Even if they
manage to obtain co-location, the potential impacts could be
limited as most known side channels have been inhibited. Such
modifications can be done at many levels [13], for example
at the CPU cache [14], [15], network layer [16], or at the
hypervisor layer [17], [18].
As a result, direct approaches have been quite effective at
eliminating most well-known cloud attack strategies based on
co-location. However, there are two clear downsides to this
category of defenses:
• They require significant modifications to the production
cloud infrastructures. Such changes are not easy to carry
out due to potential downtime and cost, given the scale
of current commercial cloud providers.
• They might not work well against unknown vulnera-
bilities. Most recent work such as [19] and [20] have
demonstrated that new side-channels will keep appearing;
and it is almost impossible to eliminate all of them.
B. Indirect approaches
On the other hand, indirect approaches aim to reduce the
chance that a malicious user can be co-located with other
ordinary users on the same PM. If it is not possible to
achieve co-location, it would be much harder to carry out
subsequent attacks. Normally, co-location prevention could
be obtained using either: i) some co-location resistant VM
placement algorithms such as [2], [9], and [21]; or ii) live,
random VM migration strategies so that it becomes hard for
anyone to locate a particular target VM, as in [22] and [23].
We note that live migration approaches may negatively affect
applications running on the cloud; while co-location resistant
VM placement could reduce resource utilization.
Compared to direct approaches, the main issue here is that
indirect approaches are not able to prevent potential side-
channel attacks once malicious users have been successfully
co-located with their victims. Another problem could be that
a resourceful attacker with a large budget could launch many
VM requests, or employ an increasing number of accounts
until he can achieve co-location. However, this type of ap-
proaches might still be of interest for two main reasons:
i) it does not require significant changes to existing cloud
platforms, and ii) it is more likely to be resilient against
arbitrary and currently unknown attacks.
Our proposed algorithm, Group Instance, belongs to the
category of indirect approaches. Compared to existing methods
in the same category, Group Instance stands out due to its
ability to handle resourceful attackers more effectively: a
single user could only co-locate with a predefined, fixed
number of other users. It has been demonstrated empirically
in our experiments that when the number of malicious users
increases, the Group Instance algorithm with an appropriate
group size remains quite resilient compared to most recent
approaches like PCUF [10], [11].
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Assumptions
We assume that a multi-tenant public IaaS cloud service
has a known number of users. The users of the service can be
categorized into one of two types: benign or malicious. Benign
users are the ordinary cloud users whose purpose is not to
steal data from other users, while the malicious users would
try to co-locate with other users to access or to compromise
the victim’s data. It is assumed that the cloud provider has
no knowledge about the classification of any particular user;
therefore it is not possible for the provider to impose certain
restrictions on potentially malicious users.
The cloud service provider is the only one who can assign
VMs to PMs. All VM requests arrive in a sequential manner,
characterized by the ID of requesting user, the number of CPU
cores and the amount memory for each request. The duration
(lifetime) of each VM which includes its start time and end
time is not known at VM placement time. We also assume
that each VM will stay on the same PM until it is terminated,
i.e., no live migration of the VM.
B. Co-location resistant VM placement
We use the same set of metrics originally proposed in [10]
for quantifying the performance of VM placement algorithms.
The objective of the Co-Location Resistant VM Placement
(CVP) problem is to assign each newly provisioned VM to the
available PMs in a way which maximizes both the resource
utilization CU and the co-location resistance CLR.
1) Core Utilization (CU ): The resource utilization of a PM
could be measured using several factors, including memory
utilization. In this paper, we measure the utilization by com-
paring actual running time of all CPU cores to their total active
time, i.e., core utilization. We note that in [24], the authors
demonstrated that the energy consumption of CPUs exceeds
all the other computer hardware. Note that the total active time
of a CPU core is basically the time during which its PM is on.
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The actual running time of a CPU core is the duration during
which the core is occupied by a VM.
2) Co-Location Resistance (CLR): Following [10], we
consider two states for a user, which are safe and unsafe,
respectively. A user is in the safe state if none of his/her
VMs is co-located with at least one malicious user during
the lifetime of the VMs. The Co-Location Resistance CLR is
computed as the ratio of all the benign users who are safe to
all benign users in the cloud. When CLR = 1, all the benign
users are safe.
IV. THE GROUP INSTANCE (GI) ALGORITHM
A. Algorithm
The GI algorithm is invoked whenever a new VM request
arrives. Its input parameters include the newly arrived VM Vi,
a list of PMs that are currently active open pms and a list
of empty PMs empty pms. Ucur is the requester of Vi. The
basic idea is that we aim to limit the number of users that
a user can be co-located with. This is done by dividing all
cloud users into a number of small groups with a fixed size
group limit. This simple strategy could limit the extent of
damage should a user is malicious. In addition, by controlling
the variable group limit, we can easily fine tune the trade-
off between CU and CLR. Below are the key steps in the GI
algorithm:
• First, verify whether the Ucur is a new cloud user or not
by checking if he/she already has a group index GUi .
If he/she is not a new cloud user, we construct a list of
eligible pms by including all the PMs from open pms
satisfying two conditions: i) have enough resource to
host Vi, and ii) currently host VMs belonging to Ucur’s
group. If the eligible pms list is not empty, we assign
Vi to a PM belonging to eligible pms which has the
least number of free cores. Otherwise, we assign Vi to a
random and empty PM, and mark that PM as occupied
by Ucur’s group.
• If Ucur is a new cloud user, we construct a list of
eligible pms which includes PMs satisfying the follow-
ing conditions: i) the PM is currently occupied by a group
that is not full, i.e. the size of this group is smaller than
the group limit, and ii) the PM still has enough resource
to host Vi. If this eligible pms list is not empty, we
assign Vi to a PM having the smallest group size selected
from eligible pms. On the other hand, if eligible pms
is empty, we create a new group Gnew for Ucur, and
assign Vi to an empty PM Pk.
• When a VM Vi is terminated from PM Pj , if there
are no other VMs on Pj , we put Pj back into the list
empty pms. We also clear the group index GPj currently
assigned to Pj .
B. Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we derive the theoretical CLR values
obtained by the GI algorithm.
1) Worst-case CLR: In this case, each individual malicious
user would be assigned to a full group, i.e., a group with
the same size as group limit. Thus, the malicious user has
successfully achieved co-location with group limit− 1 other
users. Hence, the number of benign users that are safe Nsafeb
is calculated as Nb - Nm * (group limit − 1), where Nb
and Nm are the numbers of benign users and malicious users,
respectively. As the total number of users who are safe cannot
be negative, we have:
CLR =
max(Nb −Nm ∗ (group limit− 1), 0)
Nb
(1)
2) Expected CLR: Following the methodology suggested
in [10], we derived a simple formula1 to estimate the average














We provide an example on how to make use of the derived
formula to estimate the CLR. Assume that there are 100 users,
and 2% of them are malicious, we have N = 100 and Nb =
98. If we choose group limit = 3 and use Equation (2), we
will have CLR = 96.00%. However, a potential shortcoming
of the derived formula is that with a large group limit, the
accuracy of the estimated CLR would deteriorate due to the
fact that it is less likely on average for group sizes to reach
the limit.
The formula (2) can be easily generalized for the case where
cloud users can have different group limit assigned by the
cloud provider. In this case, we divide N users into sub-
groups based on their value of group limit. The next step
is to calculate the number of users who are safe in each sub-
group. Finally, the expected total number of safe users in the
system is the sum of the results from all sub-groups.
V. EVALUATION AND RESULTS
A. Methodology
Similar to [10], we use the dataset which has been released
recently by Microsoft Azure [12]. The dataset contains a
total of 2,013,767 VMs request over a period of 30 days.
In this paper, we present the results obtained from using all
VM requests from the 11th day to 20th day of the dataset,
as the findings are quite similar for other periods of the
original dataset. We make use of the following information
in evaluating VM placement algorithms: VM id, subscription
id (considered a distinct cloud user), VM start time, VM stop
time, VM core count and VM memory (in GB). In total, there
are 619846 VM requests and 1884 different cloud users during
the 10-day duration used in this evaluation. We also assume
that the core count and memory of all PMs in the system are
the same: 32 cores and 224GB main memory for each PM.
1The calculation details have been omitted due to a restriction on the
number of pages for this paper.
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The largest VMs in the Azure dataset have 16 CPU cores and
112GB of memory.
Since the Azure dataset has no information regarding ma-
licious users, for each run we randomly select Pm% of all
users to be malicious. We repeat each algorithm over the 10-
day dataset 20 times. We then aggregate CU and CLR values
over all experiments, and use the averages for further analysis.
B. GI algorithm - impacts of different values for group limit
In the following, we use the notation GItx where x indicates
the value for group limit to denote the results derived from
the theoretical formula (2). For example, GIt3 denotes the
theoretical results for GI with group limit = 3. On the
other hand, GIx denotes the empirical results obtained with
group limit = x.





















GI1 GI2 GI3 GI4
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Fig. 1: Comparing CLR for different values of group limit.
Smaller limits provide better co-location resistance, at the cost of
lower resource utilization. group limit = 1 has the same CLR as
the Dedicated Instance approach.
TABLE I: CU values for the GI algorithm, obtained by
varying group limit
group limit 1 2 3 4 5
CU (%) 61.9 66.98 69.40 71.52 72.87
From Fig. 1 and Table I, we can observe that when
group limit increases, the value of CU will increase, while
the value of CLR decreases. This is due to the fact that
smaller group sizes result in less chance for malicious co-
location. Thus, by setting appropriate values for group limit,
we would be able to fine-tune the trade-off between CU
and CLR if needed. We also observe that by increasing
group limit, we can improve resource utilization, but only
up to a certain extent. Table I shows that group limit values
beyond 3 do not significantly increase CU .
C. GI algorithm - theoretical vs. empirical performance
Fig. 2 summarizes the difference between results obtained
empirically and those produced by the derived equation (2).
The data indicate that for small values of group limit, the
empirical and theoretical results are very similar. However,
while there is negligible difference when group limit = 2,
the gap appears to become wider as this limit increases. When
group limit = 5, the difference is quite noticeable.
One possible reason for this difference is that we assume the
average user group size to be the same or close to group limit
in our theoretical model. However, the actual average group
size will be less likely to reach the the larger group limit
most of the time. Due to smaller average group sizes, the
CLR values obtained in the empirical experiments are actually
better compared to those obtained theoretically. Therefore,
the theoretical CLR values may serve as indications of a
lower bound for the co-location resistance performance of our
algorithm.





























Fig. 2: Comparing CLR values obtained empirically and theoreti-
cally. We note that the gaps between theoretical and empirical values
are not significant especially when the group limit is small.
D. GI algorithm - compared to the state-of-the-art approaches
In this section, we compare our proposed placement strat-
egy GI with the latest co-location resistant VM placement
algorithms, namely: i) Amazon EC2’s Dedicated Instance
(DI) placement [7], and ii) Previously Co-located User First
(PCUF) by Amit. et. al. [10], [11]. Note that we do not
compare GI with Previously Selected Servers First (PSSF) by
Han et al. [9], as [10] and [11] have thoroughly demonstrated
that PCUF has a clear advantage.
1) DI approach: Two VMs that belong to different AWS
accounts are not placed on the same PM. Therefore, for
allocating a VM Vi requested by user Uj , we only consider
those PMs which currently host Uj’s VMs. Among all eligible
PMs, we will fit Uj’s new VM request using the Best-Fit bin
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Fig. 3: CLR performance for different co-location resistant place-
ment algorithms - GI , DI and PCUF .
packing approach. A new PM is started if the current PMs do
not have enough resource to take in the new VM request.
2) PCUF: Most recently, Amit et. al. [10], [11] proposed
a new placement strategy based on the co-location history of
cloud users. In this approach, each user has a log file that
records a peer list containing users whose VMs have been
placed in the same PM previously. For each VM request, the
PCUF algorithm will favor the PM which is hosting some
VMs owned by the same user himself or his peers. If no such
PM is found, a new empty PM would be started. If the user
is new to the system, his first VM would be assigned to a
randomly selected and running PM, or a brand-new PM.





















Fig. 4: CU performance for different co-location resistant placement
algorithms. Note that CU does not depend on the percentage of
malicious users in the system.
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the CLR and CU respectively,
for different co-location resistant placement algorithms on the
Azure workload with varying percentage of malicious users.
Below are some important observations from the obtained
results:
• DI has the same performance in terms of CLR and CU
as GI1. This is because when group limit is set to 1,
no cloud user would be co-located with another user. In
other word, DI can be considered a special case of GI.
• The overall performance of GI when group limit = 5 is
surprisingly close to that of PCUF. One possible reason
is that in the Azure workload, the average number of co-
located peers for each user is similar to our average group
size when group limit is set to 5.
• GI2 has much better CLR performance compared to
PCUF, especially when the percentage of malicious users
in the system is high. For instance, when %10 of the users
are potential attackers, GI2 shows a CLR improvement
of 30% compared to PCUF. This is at the cost of slightly
lower CU performance for GI2. We also note that GI2
has better CU compared to DI.
From these observations, we conclude that our proposed GI
algorithm can achieve better or at least similar overall perfor-
mance compared to state-of-the-art VM placement policies.
In addition, our new algorithm also provides the opportunity
to fine-tune the trade-off between resource utilization and co-
location resistance with ease. This can be done via setting the
appropriate values for the group limit parameter. This feature
could be of great practical implications for the following
reason. As the amount of malicious users increases with the
popularity of a cloud service, static algorithms such as PCUF
would produce less co-location resistance, as evidenced in Fig.
3. In contrast, GI is more adaptive to such a change: we can
simply reduce the group limit value and achieve a better
CLR.
For instance, if the cloud provider observes that poten-
tially malicious activities are increasing via tools such as
CloudRadar [25], the group limit should be set to smaller
values such as 3 or 2. On the other hand, a larger limit such
as 5 can be used to achieve better resource utilization. Our
GI algorithm can be configured so that a mix of different
group limit values could also be used at the same time. Fig.
5 compares the CLR in such a scenario, where 20% of the
users2 in our experiments are given a group limit = 2, while
the rest of them use group limit = 5. We observe that GI -
due to its flexibility to switch between different group limits
- clearly outperforms PCUF in this case.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose and evaluate a new co-location
resistant VM placement algorithm named Group Instance.
We then conduct performance analysis of the new approach
using resource utilization and co-location resistance as the
2These users could be identified by the cloud provider as the current targets
of some on-going co-location attacks.
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Fig. 5: CLR performance for different co-location resistant place-
ment algorithms - GI using two group limit values of 2 and 5, and
PCUF .
metrics. Both the theoretical and empirical evaluation of
Group Instance demonstrate that it can achieve better overall
performance compared to the latest published approaches. On
top of that, our new algorithm has the distinct advantage
of being simple to implement and easily tuned to adapt to
the changing landscape of cloud threats. We believe that this
advantage makes Group Instance more desirable in practical
settings.
We plan to extend this work in several directions. First, if
cloud providers are able to detect on-going co-location attacks
with certain accuracy, a complement VM migration policy
in combination with our algorithm might provide better co-
location resistance and resource utilization. Another direction
could be developing a classifier to determine if a user is
potentially malicious or not with certain probabilities. If such
information is available, we believe that Group Instance would
be able to obtain much better overall performance by grouping
users that are more likely to be malicious.
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